

11 International Campaigns in Context: Collective Action between the Local and the Global

Christian Lahusen

I. INTRODUCTION

International campaigns have strongly shaped the image of social movements in the public eye. Protest actions at the most distant places (e.g. the nuclear testing on the Mururoa Atoll in August and September 1995) and forums of non-governmental organizations (NGO) at the international conferences of the United Nations both seem to belong to the routine activism of the international networks of social movements and their organizations. Apparently grass-roots activism is increasingly being replaced by a jet set of NGO diplomats and professional activists who bring some of the exotic flair of the politically engaged 'global village' onto our TV screens. The aim of this chapter is to ask whether this representation is adequate, i.e. whether social movements are internationalizing and thus transcending the national and cross-national level to erupt onto a global arena. In particular, the role and structure of political mobilization will be addressed along these lines.¹

International campaigns provide a good case for analysing the complex structure and dynamics of collective action in the international context. Campaigns are defined commonly as a 'pre-planned set of communication activities designed by change agents to achieve certain changes in receiver behavior in a specified time period' (Rogers 1973: 277, also Rice and Atkin 1989; Salmon 1989). Thus, campaigns are *action programmes* or maps, which foresee *alter-ego* interactions. They are *thematically focused* and thus bring together activists and organizations working on similar issues, which fosters network and alliance-building within social movements (Rucht 1990). International campaigns are characterized by the fact that they move on different *levels of action* (Smith 1995; Brysk 1993). The international, the national and local arenas each provide their own actors, agendas and institutions, not only in the sense of 'external' environments and opportunity structures, but also in

terms of 'internal' movement dynamics (strategy discussions, resource allocation, learning processes, etc.). Consequently, different levels of action act as distinct but interlocking arenas with their proper institutional and organizational structures (Passy, Smith, Marks and McAdam, in this volume). In this sense, it is suggested that international campaigning does not supplant local activism since national and local contexts remain important frames of reference (Imig and Tarrow, this volume). Social movement action above the level of the nation-state is still organized and coordinated to a greater degree between national entities than across them, and is therefore rather international than transnational in character.² The vertical integration of different levels of action is then the distinguishing feature of international campaigns and sheds light onto the structure and dynamic of this form of collective action.

II. INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGNS: THE ORGANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE VENTURES

International campaigns mediate between external conditions and internal movement dynamics on the one hand, and between the global and local level on the other. These observations need to be developed more systematically, and for this purpose I shall present and analyse international campaigns by the anti-apartheid movement, Greenpeace International and Amnesty International. A bias towards Western social movements will remain evident. Further comparative studies would be required to give this chapter a broader, more international perspective.

II.1 Transnational Cooperation: the Nelson Mandela International Reception Committee

Although anti-apartheid groups operated in many countries around the world (e.g. the United States, Western and Eastern Europe, the Caribbean, West Africa and India, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Japan), few formal relations existed amongst them and no organization was active on a global scale. Rather, national anti-apartheid groups campaigned at their national level and lobbied those international organizations with which they had formal or informal relations (Minty 1978). Black South African movement organizations, particularly the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), functioned as sources of information, a shared point of reference and a pivot to coordinate and link campaigns of different national anti-apartheid organizations into a structured reciprocity of goals, activities and programmes. Here, we cannot speak of organized international mobilization because campaigns remained attached to the national or cross-national level alone.

A first major conference of anti-apartheid groups was held in 1977, the first anniversary of the Soweto uprising. From this meeting a short-lived international committee against apartheid, racism and colonialism emerged. Exchange and cooperation between national anti-apartheid organizations came about most strongly under the auspices of the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, which consulted with various anti-apartheid groups and organized a major conference in Geneva, at which an informal network of about 30 organizations was established. National anti-apartheid groups held regional meetings and coordinated some of their campaigns. These international linkages responded to specific issues that demanded some sort of international cooperation, as for example when anti-apartheid organizations from member states of the European Community set up a Liaison Group in 1988 to coordinate and exert pressure on the EC to approve sanctions against South Africa. As for the day-to-day activism, however, most anti-apartheid groups operated on the local and/or national level alone. International relations were limited to the informal exchange of information and the momentary coordination of campaigning efforts.

Under these circumstances international campaigns only came about under the guidance of national anti-apartheid organizations, such as the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) or the ANC (Minty 1978). The international campaign accompanying Nelson Mandela's release in 1990 illustrates well the structure of a coordinated action by a nationally organized movement, particularly in regard to political mobilization. The Nelson Mandela International Reception Committee was set up in early 1990 with a small London-based secretariat, which followed the example of the National Reception Committee which was created in South Africa to welcome Nelson Mandela from prison. The International Reception Committee consisted of representatives of the ANC, the South African International Defence and Aid Fund and the British AAM. It was formally launched on 8 January 1990 with an international appeal 'to the international community to ensure that the release of Nelson Mandela is not only made an occasion for great celebration but also becomes an opportunity for us all to rededicate ourselves to the struggle to end apartheid' (in AAM 1990: 10). Within a month of its launch National Reception Committees had been established in several countries, and prominent persons from across the world had agreed to act as patrons.³ Coordinated actions took place worldwide on 2 February to coincide with De Klerk's address to the tricameral parliament and again on the day of Nelson Mandela's release on 11 February. Each National Reception Committee encouraged or hosted activities in their respective countries in order to celebrate the day and step up the struggle to end apartheid.

In the spring of 1990 the international campaign entered a further phase of activities. Nelson Mandela and other representatives of the ANC made several trips between April and October to visit the different National

Reception Committees around the world. These trips were aimed at rededicating public support for the anti-apartheid struggle, increasing international pressure on Pretoria and raising funds for ANC trusts.⁴ National anti-apartheid groups and reception committees used these trips to organize a number of further events and activities. In this sense, resource allocation and protest action were both organized nationally; however, they were coordinated by the International Reception Committee and the ANC, and thus integrated into a consistent international campaign framework.

II.2 The Strategic Map of International Campaigns: Greenpeace International

Greenpeace International can be described as a highly centralized and hierarchical 'multinational protest corporation' (Rucht 1995b; Eyerman and Jamison 1989). This picture also holds true for their international campaigns. These campaigns are planned and approved by Greenpeace's governing body, the International Council (also called the Board of Trustees). The latter is composed of one delegate from each national Greenpeace office, although only nine of the 30 national bureaux have a right to vote. The body meets annually to decide on finances and organizational matters for the following year and to approve the budget of every national bureau. Most importantly, the Council also agrees on the main areas, issues, strategies and objectives of international campaigning. In this case, campaign planning means the development of a centralized strategic map, which specifies the type of campaigning instruments to be used and the role of the different national bureaux and activist groups. For this purpose, Greenpeace bureaux are grouped into geopolitical regions. The latter enable Greenpeace International to structure decision-making processes and campaigning work.⁵

National bureaux have some room for movement in this rigid organizational structure. They participate in the discussion about strategies and tactics. Moreover, they are responsible for conducting public information, fund-raising and membership drives in their respective countries – a task that is also transferred to local groups, e.g. in Germany. Finally, they can make their own decisions about organizational matters and campaigns regarding issues of national relevance. However, given the centralization of campaign planning and enforcement, conflicting interests and views amongst national bureaux and local groups are inevitably drawn onto the international level. Particularly in the last couple of years internal financial and organizational difficulties have led to recurrent conflicts, which have been accompanied by an increasing 'Germanization' of Greenpeace International.⁶

This organizational structure goes hand in hand with the professionalism of Greenpeace's activism (Rucht 1995b). Non-violent actions by the *wet suits* are complemented by the 'elite campaigning' of the *dry suits*, who lobby govern-

ments, industry and public interest groups, and participate in international conferences and committees. In all aspects, Greenpeace sets the inner circle of professional activists and strategists apart from the broad constituency of about 3.7 million supporters in its 30 countries, because it is not so much interested in the coordination of worldwide mass actions, as in the optimization of campaign efficiency, organizational invulnerability and the authority of professional advocacy. Any widening of participatory options would interfere with the strategic maps and reduce organizational combat efficiency.

The following campaign illustrates this particular form of internationally coordinated collective action. In February 1995 Greenpeace found out about the British Shell Petroleum Company's intention to dump their oil-tank platform Brent Spar at sea. By 9 May 1995, the British oil company had acquired the final approval of the British government and intended to start hauling the oil platform from the North Sea to the Atlantic. In the meantime, Greenpeace International had set up a campaign structure that included the international campaign coordination by their Shetland offices, a multinational crew of *wet suits* and the Dutch, British and German bureaux. Other European branches also supported the campaign as it evolved. Basically the campaign consisted of three types of activities with different targets and functions (see also Vorfelder 1995). First, about 30 activists were shipped to the oil platform, and with them an international host of journalists. In the following seven weeks, these *wet suit* activists repeatedly occupied the platform, providing impressive pictures of a 'sea battle' between Greenpeace activists and the oil company's crew. Second, Greenpeace's *dry suit* activists started lobbying company and government officials on 30 April, the day of the first occupation of the platform. Moreover, they aimed to put the issue on the agenda of the forthcoming conference on the protection of the North Sea, held on 8–9 June 1995, in Esbjerg, Denmark. The unveiling of a 9-metre replica of the platform at the conference was accompanied by a second occupation of the platform. Although no general prohibition of the sea-dumping of platforms was decided upon, the Environmental Ministers of Denmark, Germany and other European countries (as well as the European Union's Commissioner on the Environment, Ritt Bjerregard) nevertheless voiced their opposition to Shell's intention and Britain's approval. Third, Greenpeace activists conducted actions at Shell petrol stations, distributing flyers and postcards. The first demonstrations were held on 2 June at 300 petrol stations in 80 German cities, the second was organized for 16 June in Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland, coinciding with the third occupation of the platform.

This campaign mobilized broad support, particularly in Germany, where all political parties, high-ranking government officials, the Protestant and Catholic churches, unions, environmental organizations and a number of other

associations joined in – with even Chancellor Kohl intervening in favour of the campaign, using the G7 economic summit in Halifax, Canada, on 15 June to try and convince the British Prime Minister, John Major, to withdraw his approval. Moreover, these associations, along with the general mass media, called the public to join in a boycott of Shell products. The consumer boycott was, therefore, neither explicitly organized nor performed in the name of Greenpeace. The boycott, which started first in Germany and reduced Shell's revenues between 20 and 30 per cent (in metropolitan areas around 50 per cent), later gained momentum in Britain, where a reduction of about 20 per cent was reported. At first, both Shell UK and the British government refused to revoke their decisions. However, particularly after the campaign began to expand beyond Germany into other European countries, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group convened a meeting of the Committee of Managing Directors on 20 June 1995. On the same day, British Shell announced its decision to dismantle its platform on-shore. As much as this success was the fruit of a broad coalition of actors, Greenpeace could still take most of the credit itself. This victory ended a long period of internal organizational problems and increasing public disinterest,⁷ but raised much criticism about the goals and means of the campaign in the aftermath.

II.3 Coordinating Individual and Group Participation: Amnesty International

As in the case of Greenpeace, Amnesty International also aims to secure the cohesiveness of their campaigns via an international structuration, finalization and formalization of their activism. The latter is not only coordinated between countries according to the distinct agendas, potentials and styles of national sections, but also across them, in that a common transnational activism is instituted. Organizational decision-making procedures and platforms are an important instrument in this regard. The International Council Meeting (with its 300–400 participants and 200–300 voting national delegates) is considered to be the organization's parliament and aims to ensure a broad and democratic debate about the common campaigning work. It is primarily a platform for harmonizing the different agendas and interests of the various national sections into a comprehensive two-year plan, with binding working guidelines and priorities. It elects the International Executive Committee that has a two-year term of office to oversee the work of the national sections and the International Secretariat (which is responsible for research, information and administration). National sections are then called to specify and realize this broad framework, leaving them enough room to conduct membership drives, provide public information and carry out proper campaigning work. They may also decide organizational matters on their own.

Hence, the organizational format does not distinguish Amnesty from Greenpeace as both differentiate between the centralized international 'policy definition' and the decentralized organization of day-to-day activism. Rather, the role of the members and the transnationally coordinated letter-writing campaigns Amnesty's the distinguishing features. First of all, Amnesty International's campaigns are not carried out by a carefully chosen team of professional activists, but rather by the many letter-writing individuals and groups – not counting the many other campaign activities they conduct regarding public information and a drive for new members. Political mobilization does not mean the allocation of resources for the advocacy work of a professional activist circle, but rather it is the activation of public participation in (urgent) action networks, where the allocation of resources is certainly an important task. Secondly, mandates and action techniques are designed to institute transnational activism. This is particularly true for letter-writing – Amnesty's distinctive action technique used persistently to put pressure on governments with regard to abuses of human rights. Although the national sections are responsible for campaigning, letter-writing campaigns are organized according to the types of cases (urgent action network, prisoners of the month, special campaigns for children, lawyers, etc.) and membership categories (individuals or groups and the different types of groups, e.g. lawyers, students, women) instead of by national territories. This transnational activism is then complemented by the many supportive activities of local groups and the national sections' public information and mobilization campaigns.

The Human Rights Awareness Campaign of 1988 serves as a good example of this organizational format because it included most of Amnesty's routine campaign instruments and aimed at fostering the internationalization of Amnesty's work itself. Taking the forthcoming 40th anniversary of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an opportunity, the organizers of the campaign set up two goals, namely to raise worldwide awareness of the issue of human rights and to develop work in countries of the Southern hemisphere, where Amnesty's presence was still weak. This campaign centred on the collection of signatures on behalf of the Declaration and demanded its ratification and enforcement by all national governments. For this purpose, 'passports' with all of the articles of the Universal Declaration were produced, translated into 52 languages and distributed worldwide. The petition was included in these passports, but also publicized in the media. National sections and local groups were then called upon to organize a variety of different events to promote the Declaration. Local Amnesty groups used these events to promote their own work, inform the public about cases of human rights violations and ask for telegrams, faxes and letters. This campaign was successful in recruiting a substantial constituency, although increases were most prominent in sections that already had a basic organizational structure to attract and keep its membership (e.g. in Italy, Spain,

Greece, Argentina, Japan, India, where membership doubled). Moreover, this campaign unleashed an internal learning process fostered by the strengthening of sections of the Southern hemisphere and an internal debate about those human rights included in the Universal Declaration which were not embraced by the mandate of Amnesty itself.

III. THE CONTEXTUALITY OF INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGNING

As in the campaigns selected, activists of a number of social movements increasingly underline the importance of the international arena and aim to adapt their campaigns to its structures and dynamics. International campaigns thus respond both to internal and external conditions: they strive to publicize their issues and demands within the mass media in order to influence the public and they aim to exert pressure for (political or social) change within a system of international relations. In the following, these issues are given further consideration because they unveil important aspects and dimensions, structures and dynamics of international campaigns. Particular attention is given to the interplay between the global and local levels.

III.1 In the Search of a Global Public: Working the Mass Media

Public campaigns aim to publicize their issues, set public and policy agendas and mobilize support for their activism (Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986; Neidhardt 1994). Mass media are of particular importance because *public* campaigns are necessarily carried by the media and thus are strongly shaped by their structure and functioning. The mass media do not only determine what is covered as 'daily news', but also how it is done. For example, they determine what is reported as local, national or international news. Campaigners are thus interested in shaping international news coverage, not least because the latter has a strong impact on local programming as well.

The structure of the international media has been characterized as a worldwide news market and as an institutional field with its own rules, both in the sense of habitualized working routines and normative canons of 'good journalism' (Dijk 1988). The vertical and horizontal integration of the international mass media has been of particular importance because it brought about a highly integrated circuit of media products. In this regard, the financial entanglement of news agencies, publishing companies, television channels and radio stations has integrated the international mass media on a vertical dimension through the amalgamation of all actors involved in the production and dissemination of news (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Reeves 1993).

The vertical integration of the international media acts as a decisive constraint on campaigning. Campaigns need to find access to this international

news circuit in order to become 'world news'. For this purpose, activists use forthcoming events or occurrences of international relevance, for example, international conferences, anniversaries, resolutions or conflicts, natural disasters, scientific discoveries or reports. These events are treated as 'opportunities' for campaigning. The Human Rights Awareness Campaign of Amnesty International is a good example. As mentioned before, this campaign used the 40th anniversary of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights to raise awareness and promote the development of smaller Amnesty sections. The international campaigning activities in particular were organized as media events that capitalized on and highlighted special occasions: the first international press conference in Brazil coincided with the International Human Rights Day (9 December 1987), the closing event took place on 10 December 1988, the 40th Anniversary of the Declaration.

'Opportunities' are not ready-made entrance tickets, though, because they often need to be construed as news themselves. The planned sinking of the Brent Spar oil-platform is a good example because this event never would have become international news without the various Greenpeace actions. Greenpeace actions are organized to make the most effective use of media coverage and presuppose, therefore, a careful evaluation of the conditions necessary for successful agenda-setting. Activists know, for example, that campaigning has to pay tribute to the often repeated preference of the mass media for visible events to the detriment of intangible and continuous issues (Fowler 1991; Dijk 1988; Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986). This calls for a continuous attempt to adapt long-term campaigns to current events and agendas. The oil platform symbolized well the pollution of the North Sea by over 420 off-shore platforms in particular, and the threat to ocean ecology in general. Moreover, the *wet suit* crews needed to be multinational in composition in order to conduct non-violent actions which were not associated with any one national origin. In this way, local occurrences (e.g. the sea-dumping) were 'framed' (Gamson and Modigliani 1987) as issues of global relevance to be covered by the international media. Moreover, the sea-dumping also provided a good opponent onto which grievances could be projected and to which the narrative repertoire of Greenpeace campaigns could be applied: David against Goliath; the commitment of activists, even in the face of dangers, against the greedy interests of corporate profit-making; the selfless dedication of environmentalists against the selfishness of the establishment. The repeated (and partially revoked) indication that highly toxic waste and oil were to be sunk with the oil platform added the issue of hazards as a dramatizing tool.

Media coverage is a crucial instrument for providing public information, image-building and promotion, and thus an agent of political mobilization (Gamson 1988). In this regard, the increasing horizontal integration of entertainment industries and mass media (Wallis 1990; Reeves 1993), and the

complementary amalgamation of information and entertainment into so-called 'infotainment' (Altheide and Snow 1991: 48–50) provide a further set of opportunities for political mobilization. This is true for the campaigns of most social movement organizations (SMOs), yet is nicely exemplified by the campaigns described above. British AAM, for instance, staged two international pop concerts as part of its larger campaign on behalf of Nelson Mandela's release: (a) the 'Nelson Mandela 70th Birthday Tribute' (11 June 1988) was broadcasted to 72 countries and reached a potential audience of 200 million viewers, 72,000 of whom attended the concert at Wembley Stadium;⁸ and (b) the 'Nelson Mandela: An International Tribute for a Free South Africa' (16 April 1990) was staged as the first public address of Nelson Mandela to the world and as a British contribution to the International Reception Committee campaign. Amnesty International, for its part, had conducted a 'Human Rights Now!' world tour of international pop stars in the autumn of 1988 as the core element of its larger Human Rights Awareness Campaign. More than 1 million people attended the 18 concerts and more than a billion television viewers saw the three hour documentary of the tour transmitted to 67 countries on 10 December 1988.⁹

This convergence of the globalization and concentration of the mass media enabled SMOs to conceive and conduct public campaigns that reached out to the global public and had reinforcing, synergetic effects. News and entertainment products had multiple 'entries' into the market (e.g. the international media covered several venues of Amnesty's 'Human Rights Now!' world tour), and entertainment events were covered as news, and vice versa. Moreover, because broadcast entertainment had become a profitable commercial business, activists were able to link media coverage to fund-raising and skim off the profits generated by the business (e.g. through charity concerts and record sales), regardless of how successful they were in mobilizing the donations of individual viewers. 'Success' became a matter of commercial feasibility and economic profit-taking, and not so much a matter of 'traditional' political mobilization – a phenomenon that can be called 'protest simulacra' (Lahusen 1996).

Hence, the media become a tool for providing public information and an instrument of resource allocation alike. Once admitted to the global circuit of media products, the international repercussion of campaigning is quasi-guaranteed because of the internal structure and the own interests of the media sector. However, as 'gatekeepers', the international media expect events and campaigns to be 'newsworthy' for their various audiences. Here, the global and local arenas become two distinct, but complementary and interlocked levels of campaigning. On the one hand, news often refers to local events. Campaigning thus needs to highlight the international relevance of local occurrences, for instance, by coordinating several local activities in reference

to a common (local) issue. On the other hand, local campaigning has to take up or put (back) into context what the international media report about international campaigns.¹⁰ The vertical integration of different campaign levels thus becomes an important prerequisite of successfully working the system of international media.

III.2 Effecting International Pressure: Working International Relations

While international institutions provide social movements with platforms and instruments for global activism, this form of political involvement is determined by the quantity and quality of international treaties, secretariats or intergovernmental organizations. Furthermore, these international organizations work with a complex system of national representatives who participate in the long-term planning and routine decision-making processes. Finally, even if international agreements are binding (which is not always the case), they still need to be ratified and implemented by the individual nation-states. These conditions shape the type of activism used by a social movement because the latter has to fit into the complexity of international regimes (Thränhardt 1992; Rittberger and Zürn 1991). On the one hand, activists have to be able to communicate and interact with international institutions, e.g. by maintaining a bureau at their headquarters, sending delegations to conferences, arranging common committees or meetings. On the other hand, activists have to be able to mobilize support in various countries and to exert pressure on single governments, also in regard to decision-making within international governmental organizations.

This was evidently the case in the 'International Reception Committee' campaign. During the 1980s, national anti-apartheid movements were successful in urging their governments into (more or less) severe sanctions, yet with a reform of the apartheid system in sight, this anti-apartheid coalition threatened to crumble in 1990. Indeed, within South Africa chances for an eradication of the apartheid system were better than ever before and when Nelson Mandela was released from prison, most black organizations were no longer banned and official negotiations for a new constitution had been scheduled. It was evident, though, that the South African regime was willing to reform, but not overthrow the apartheid system (and with it white supremacy). Furthermore, any substantial progress within the transition of South Africa was attributed to the internal unity and strength of the black movement and to the external pressure of the international community. At this stage, however, any progress could still be reversed. For this reason, activists were concerned about maintaining international pressure on South Africa. Particularly the continuous attempts of the Thatcher government to subvert the international consensus, and the unilateral relaxation of sanctions by a number of countries¹¹ made a comprehensive, international campaign indis-

pensable. Within the framework of the International Reception Committee campaign, national anti-apartheid movements organized a number of public events and lobbied their governments. ANC leaders made trips to the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference in May 1990 and to Europe and North America in June and July 1990, both in order to isolate proponents of a relaxation of international sanctions (particularly the British government) and to rededicate heads of government to the international coalition against apartheid. Certainly the strong mobilization phase of early 1990 was not successful in maintaining sanctions until the first elections. However undoubtedly these campaigns were effective in committing the international community to South Africa's democratization and to the support of the ANC as the main political force in this process.

For international policies regarding South Africa, the nation-state persisted as a critical actor and a prominent target and medium of the anti-apartheid movement's campaigns. This observation is also true for international movement organizations. Here, the internationalization of collective action can become a matter of organizational planning, and strategies can operate either as a pure 'top-down' strategy (Greenpeace), as a 'bottom-up' alliance of local or national associations (anti-apartheid movement), or a mixture of both (Amnesty International). These international organizations have to operate in a diversity of territories with distinct legal contexts and political systems, different sets of actors and a number of disparate norms and rules for political campaigning, organization and association. Consequently, these international organizations commonly operate through their national sections, regional offices and local groups (particularly in relation to public information and the mobilization of support). They formulate their strategies (and the role of individual bureaux and groups) according to the role national actors (governments, state institutions, corporations) play with regard to the issue at stake and conceive of public information and mobilization campaigns which are adapted to the specific features of the respective societies. In Greenpeace's case, for instance, the national framework operated both with conducive and restrictive consequences. First, the Brent Spar campaign undoubtedly gained the most momentum in Germany. The initial support for this campaign was lower in Britain, in France newspapers even wondered about the environmentalist peculiarities of Germany. This initial geographical restriction was, however, not detrimental. Germany constituted an important market with Shell Germany contributing 11.5 percent to the Royal Dutch/Shell Group's total revenues. Moreover, the British and Dutch activists (as well as the other European bureaux) took on the complementary role of carrying out campaign activities at the national Shell companies and at Shell's headquarters in The Hague. They also lobbied their own governments. In the end, each Greenpeace bureau benefited from the other national campaigns. Media coverage in Britain, for instance, increased decisively in mid-June as a reaction to the

European continent's public debate and broad coalition, and enabled a rapid growth in the momentum of public mobilization.

Second, Greenpeace's opponent was not so much the multinational Royal Dutch/Shell Group, but rather the British Shell Petroleum company. Shell is structured into over 130 autonomous companies with the explicit intention of adapting better corporate strategies to the national context of operation. Although all Shell companies involved repeatedly insisted that responsibility for the sea-dumping rested with Britain alone, the multinational's intraorganizational structure was conducive to Greenpeace's victory because the campaign could capitalize on and broaden potential cleavages between national companies.¹² British Greenpeace activists were aware that they could not win the campaign against Shell UK by themselves and in fact, company and government officials upheld their intention to dump the platform at sea in disregard of national and international protest. International and intraorganizational pressure was therefore an important campaigning instrument. Hence, when the Committee of Managing Directors took up the issue of Brent Spar by convening a meeting with the directors of the British, Dutch and German companies on 20 June 1995, it was not only concerned with settling an intraorganizational conflict amongst national companies, but also with reacting to the international media coverage (e.g. in CNN, the *Financial Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*) and initiatives within international politics that were unleashed by the campaign and seemed harmful to the multinational corporation's overall interests and strategies. Success was to be found, therefore, in the vertical integration of different action levels: the pressure on the company was *multiplied* by the coordinated activities of various Greenpeace bureaux (and pressure could be augmented by the successive mobilization of further sections) and gained a new quality in that the multinational corporation needed to react to societal demands between and above individual countries.

Therefore, while the national level remains an important frame of reference for international campaigning, this context does not exclude but rather fosters a complementarity between local events and internationally coordinated action. International organizations, for instance, reconstruct national entities into supranational territories. There are logistical reasons for this, such as Amnesty's centralized production of campaigning materials and annual reports for different language areas. Moreover, the national level is reorganized for political reasons as well. Greenpeace's geopolitical regions, for example, bundle diverse national bureaux into distinct territories in order to structure decision-making processes and campaign work. Moreover, activists institute international organizational structures (bureaux, staff, delegations, etc.) that allow them to relate and interact with international institutions directly. Finally, while resource allocation and public information remains strongly 'nationalized' and 'localized', the coordination of collective

action is 'internationalized'. Only partially, however, do activists conceive of forms of activism that move beyond and across the nation-state. Amnesty, for instance, centres primarily on transnational pressure. Their letter-writing campaigns are based on a multitude of individuals and groups from different countries. Membership and action forms are differentiated according to social rather than national traits, i.e. groups of youths, liberal arts professionals, women, minorities, etc. work on related cases. For Amnesty only through this transnational outreach can the global aspect of the human rights issue be affronted and adequately symbolized.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

'Globality' is not only an explicit goal of many social movements, but it is becoming an attribute of their activism as well. In this regard, international collective action cannot be reduced to the sum of local or national protest events and movement actors because we are dealing with different conditions and structures of aggregation and integration. In other words, internationalization is a process in interplay with the national and local level, but relatively autonomous from it. For international campaigning, this observation means that demands and programmes, forms of action and organization cannot simply be transferred to the international arena because structural features and conditions for success are of a different kind. The international level provides its own actors, issues and institutions, to which 'internal' movement dynamics have to be adapted. The internationalization of social movement organizations has, however, not operated to the detriment of the national and/or local level. Internationalization and localization should thus not be conceived of as in opposition to each other because the national context does remain an important frame of reference. Thus, nationally operating movement actors might find it hard to gain access to the international arena and international organizations might struggle with establishing themselves in specific places.

Finally, international campaigns mirror the variability of formats and strategies of movement action. In general, though, it was observed that political mobilization is mostly differentiated along its two components: (a) membership recruitment, public information and resource allocation are decentralized and carried out locally in order to adapt better to local conditions; (b) the definition of policies and the coordination of collective action are 'centralized' internationally in order to structure and finalize local and national activities into a well-integrated international venture and better adapt to global conditions. The integrative frame of action is then provided by organizational formats, which oscillate between a federalized structure of (Semi-) autonomous national sections or local groups, and a unitary structure

that blends the diversity of (local) activities into a (semi-) hierarchic, goal-directed venture. Hence, rather than assuming a uni-directional development of collective action, the cases analysed suggest the persistent importance of national and local levels. It is argued that collective action by internationally organized social movements is constituted by a vertical integration of different fields of action that places international campaigns between the global and the local.

NOTES

1. This chapter is a reworked version of a paper presented at the conference on 'Cross-national influences and social movement research' in Mt Pélerin, Switzerland, on 15–19 June 1995. I particularly owe thanks to Hanspeter Kriesi, Dieter Rucht and Donatella della Porta, Sidney Tarrow, John McCarthy and Clark McPhail for their comments and criticism. I am grateful to Helen Nurse and Susan Madiedo for correcting the English manuscript.
2. A terminological specification of these kinds of organizations (e.g. as transnational organizations) seems difficult. Rucht (1995a) is correct in arguing that supranationally operating social movement organizations can be labelled cross-, inter-, trans- or multinational, depending on the particular features of the organization's activism, its different campaigns and the purposes of analysis. Indeed, in the following it will be suggested that supranational campaigns move on diverse arenas complementarily, i.e. carry features of inter- and transnational activism alike, particularly evident in the case of Amnesty International's campaigns. Still, the notion of 'international campaigns' is thought to capture the persistent importance of the national context better, as will be argued later on.
3. The Nelson Mandela International Reception Committee was composed of prime ministers or presidents of many countries, and other celebrities such as Ruud Gullit (a well-known Dutch soccer player), the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Mme Danielle Mitterrand, Mrs Lisbet Palme and Archbishop Desmond Tutu.
4. The tour raised funds for the Matla Trust and its programmes for the resettlement of refugees, and for housing, health care and education. Further donations went to the Democracy for South Africa Fund to help the ANC prepare for the negotiations and the coming democratization. The media reported that the Mandela trips raised about 115 million rand.
5. Greenpeace has nine regions that comprise 30 offices. These regions were put together to facilitate logistics, coordinate the work of different bureaux, service countries in regions that have no bureaux of their own, and involve those countries in the decision-making process which have no offices or right to vote. These regions are Asia-Pacific (Australia, New Zealand and Japan), North America (USA, Canada, Mexico), Northern South America (Belize, Guatemala with their own offices and Venezuela, Colombia, the Guineas, the Caribbean without bureaux), Southern South America (Argentina, Chile, Brazil with offices, and Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador without), Northwestern Europe (Ireland, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg), the Mediterranean

- (Spain, Tunisia, France, Italy, Greece), Scandinavia (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway), Eastern Central Europe (Russia, the Ukraine, the Czech Republic) and Western Central Europe (Germany, Austria, Switzerland).
6. For five years Greenpeace International has been in a prolonged crisis, as activists and commentators have readily agreed. Organizational problems regard not only finances (fund-raising has only remained stable in Germany), but also mandates and strategies. In 1995 the budget of Greenpeace International was reduced from \$40 million to \$27 million (the total income of all bureaux and companies was around \$150 million) and over 100 activists had to leave the organization. Due to this situation Greenpeace Germany could expand its international influence. Two thirds of the budget of Greenpeace International is financed by the Hamburg office and in September 1995 Thilo Bode, former secretary-general of the German bureau, was elected to the main chair of Greenpeace International. Activists of other national sections were worried about German predominance – a fact repeatedly quoted in the media.
 7. In 1995 Greenpeace Netherlands was able to recruit 22,000 new members (adding to a constituency of 608,000), while in Germany activists were able to recruit a further 3,000 new members and raise an additional DM3 million, mounting to a new record of DM74 million in donations – in a period of overall stagnation in the non-profit sector. Moreover, the campaign increased the reputation of the organization, strengthening the position and influence of Greenpeace, as observed by Thilo Bode, the former secretary-general of the German bureau. Undoubtedly, this success is not only to be attributed to the Brent Spar campaign, since the actions against the French nuclear tests have also played a decisive role.
 8. This event was staged as an 11-hour performance by a large number of international rock and pop stars. It raised \$3.6 million through ticket sales, broadcasting rights and donations. Media coverage, written responses and membership recruitment were substantial, although no figures were released by the movement.
 9. In all countries the media coverage was extremely good and many national sections were able to double their membership (e.g. in Italy, Spain, Greece, Japan). In the end, Amnesty staff collected 1.2 billion signatures world-wide and delivered them to the United Nations on 10 December 1988, the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 'Conspiracy of Hope' tour, which was organized in the US in 1986 and which provided a model for the later 'Human Rights Now!' world tour, had already recruited a 100,000 new members to the US section of Amnesty.
 10. It is crucial to underline that the concert shows mentioned were treated and launched in the international media as 'world news' or 'world entertainment', while the encompassing campaign framework remained a national and/or local news only. Hence, it made a great difference to which arenas news and entertainment were directed, which stories and formats were used, and which media networks and entertainment industries produced and aired them.
 11. Britain first relaxed its cultural, academic and scientific boycott of South Africa on 2 February 1990, and announced plans to lift the voluntary bans on new investment and the promotion of tourism. Also a number of countries in Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland and Rumania) and Africa (Malagasy, Cote d'Ivoire and Zaire) had unilaterally established diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa. Moreover, international isolation of South Africa had been eroded by the reception of F.W. de Klerk during his visit to Europe in May 1990.

12. For instance, the German company had just launched a public campaign that insisted on corporate responsibilities for the environment (its slogan being: 'We want to change something') and was most eager to show sensitivity towards environmental issues.