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PHILOSOPHY AND WORLDVIEW HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE BADEN SCHOOL OF NEO-KANTIANISM

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Already in his first published Freiburg lecture series¹ in the 1919 War Emergency Semester Heidegger energetically attempts to reach a concept of philosophy. He elaborates his own position by means of a critical confrontation with doctrines of his time. Of particular significance is Heidegger's critical discussion of Baden neo-Kantianism. This preoccupation of the earlier Heidegger is easily identifiable by the fact that more than a quarter of the semester's lectures are directed to this theme. The seminars of the next semester are devoted exclusively to a phenomenological critique of the philosophy of value.²

The great significance of this theme for Heidegger's philosophical devel-

opment is already discernable against his biographical-historical background. During his years as a young scholar, Heidegger had been in considerable agreement with the position of Heinrich Rickert. He was, as Rickert noticed³ and as Heidegger himself knew, in fact greatly influenced by Emil Lask. In his 1913 dissertation, "The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical and Positive Essay on Logic," Heidegger referred positively to Rickert's and Lask's doctrine of judgment.⁴ Heidegger's 1915 *Habilitation*, "The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus," written under Rickert's supervision, was dedicated to Heinrich Rickert "in gratitude and admiration." In the preface, Heidegger elaborates on his dedication:

A dedication is an expression of indebted gratitude; it is, however, simultaneously to express the conviction, in keeping with one's own standpoint, that philosophy of value, with its world-view character and awareness of problems, is summoned to a decisive forward movement and deepening of philosophical procedure. Its intellectual-historical orientation provides a fertile ground for creatively shaping the problems out of a strong, personal experience.⁵

In this regard, Emil Lask, "to whom at this point a word of grateful, respectful remembrance is sent to his distant soldier's grave,"⁶ is exemplary for Heidegger. As will be shown in the following, the way in which Heidegger realizes his intentions is already apparent in the first published series of Freiburg lectures. The characteristic connection between philosophy and worldview that one finds in Rickert's philosophy of value is indeed, as a program, given up. It is given up, however, just as personal lived experience since the ground of a creative reorganization of philosophical problems in fact becomes the kernel of Heidegger's new conception of philosophy.⁷ Heidegger's approach is described in the foreword to his *Habilitation* as motivated by an encounter with neo-Kantianism. The significance of Rickert for the young Heidegger is underlined in the end by the *curriculum vitae* prepared during the time he was working on the *Habilitation*. After the break with his theological studies, Heidegger began to study mathematics in the winter semester of 1911–1912. Rickert's influence on Heidegger's further philosophical development is stressed by Heidegger in two places:

My philosophical interest was not diminished by studying mathematics. On the contrary, since I no longer had to abide by the prescribed seminars in philosophy, I was able to attend a more extended selection of philosophy lectures, and above all I could participate in Herr Geheimrat Rickert's seminars. It was in the new school that I first became acquainted with philosophical problems and gained insight into the essence of logic, a philosophical discipline which thus far interests me the most.⁸

Last, but not least, it is through the thorough preoccupation with Rickert's *Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* that Heidegger's aversion to history, nurtured by his preference for mathematics, is fundamentally destroyed. In this way, Heidegger recognizes that philosophy cannot orient itself solely by mathematics nor solely by history.⁹ In his second published series of Freiburg lectures, in the summer semester of 1919, Heidegger dates the beginning of his critical confrontation with Rickert to the period after his dissertation:

The basic direction of the critical reflections was already pursued in critical seminar papers presented in 1913 in Rickert's seminar during discussions of the Laskian "*Lehre vom Urteil*." Here I encountered great opposition, which however—and this remark is really superfluous—in no way strained my personal relationship to Rickert.¹⁰

Of course, it is well-known that in the meantime Rickert was very disappointed in Heidegger's meager regard for his philosophy after Rickert himself left Freiburg in 1915 to assume Windelband's chair in Heidelberg, vacant because of his death; it appeared as if Heidegger was increasingly turning to Husserl, who in 1916 became successor to Rickert in Freiburg.¹¹

As one can already recognize in the title of the 1919 War Emergency Semester lecture, *Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem* (The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview), Heidegger works his critical confrontation with Rickert's philosophy into the context of the contemporary debate over the relationship between philosophy and worldview. Dilthey, Husserl, Rickert, Jaspers, and Spranger had expressed

themselves on this theme, partly through sharp, critical references to one another. And so Dilthey's conception of life-philosophy became the target of Husserl's famous *Logos* essay of 1910, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (Philosophy as Strict Science) while Jaspers's *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (The Psychology of Worldviews) was contested by Rickert.¹²

Criticizing life-philosophy as well as neo-Kantian philosophy, existence-philosophy as well as the phenomenological view, Heidegger cannot come to terms with any of the representative positions. It is perhaps no coincidence that Heidegger dealt with this theme in his first seminar immediately upon his return from the war, for an awareness of an epochal crisis was, from the beginning, already articulated in this set of questions concerning the relationship of philosophy and worldview, a crisis that in particular was dramatically named by the otherwise sober Husserl: "The spiritual affliction of our time has in fact become unbearable. . . . It is rather the most radical affliction of life, from which we suffer, an affliction that at no point in our life ceases."¹³

The achievements of the nineteenth century—the intensification of science and industrialization—resulted in the loss of a unified world picture and, with that, the loss of a self-evident orientation for leading one's life. The experience of the World War I must have heightened the awareness of a crisis and it must have cast doubt on the attempt at a resolution, which still in the empire appeared acceptable as a possibility and which also served to justify academic philosophy within this community.¹⁴ The fact that Heidegger takes up this discussion indicates that he is also aware of a crisis in culture and in philosophy, and that means that his new conception of philosophy is also to be understood, in this context, as a response.

For Heidegger, the problem of the relationship between philosophy and worldview presents itself at first as a conflict between two positions. The first maintains that every great philosophy culminates in a worldview; this approach is synonymous with the notion that philosophy, in its innermost tendency, is metaphysics. Philosophy is, in other words, only the conclusion and completion of the reconciliation of opposites—itsself a tendency inherent in life—in a unified, justified whole.¹⁵

It is not difficult to recognize Dilthey's conception here. According to Dilthey, worldviews are objectifications of life. They are interpretations, meaningful indications of the world, "spiritual shapes," in which the cog-

nition of the world and the appreciation of life are so related to one another that life ideals arise out of them. The moments of knowing, feeling, and willing, moments constituting the structure of all mental life, are brought to expression in world-picture, life experience, and ideal.

Dilthey's "Main Proposition of the Doctrine of Worldview" reads as follows:

World-views are not "products of thinking." They do not emerge out of the mere will of the understanding. The conception of reality is an important moment in their formation, but only one. World-views emerge out of an attitude and experience of life, out of the structure of our psychic totality. The elevation of life to consciousness in the cognition of reality, the appreciation of life, and the performance of the will is the slow and difficult work achieved by humanity in the development of lifeviews.¹⁶

Worldviews do not only come from life; they, in turn, affect life. Because worldviews of higher, more complete forms develop themselves out of a basic, vegetative stratum of infinite, particular worldviews, they can for their part counter what is restless, contingent, and particular with repose, steadfastness, and universality.

Dilthey delimits three of these higher forms of worldview: the religious, the aesthetic, and the philosophical.¹⁷ (Cf. Bd. 8, S.87 ff.) A worldview *problem* arises with regard to the philosophical type. As opposed to the religious type of worldview, the philosophical worldview is universal and universally valid. As to the poetic type of worldview, the philosophical worldview reforms life. According to Dilthey, metaphysics is a type of worldview that is grasped conceptually and justified, hence raised to the level of universal validity. The problem is whether the claim to a scientific worldview ever reaches its goal, that is, whether the other religious and aesthetic forms can be transposed into a philosophical worldview, and whether, and on what basis, it is possible to choose a superior type among the historical variety of metaphysical shapes.

It is obvious that the thought of the scientific nature of the worldview contradicts the thought of the worldview's rootedness in the *totality* of mental life, to which feeling and value also belong. Dilthey's conclusion is

that it is impossible to establish worldviews in the strict sense of scientific metaphysics: individuality, circumstances, nationhood, and the "day and age" are factors that, for poets as well as for philosophers, give rise to unavoidable singularities in a world-vision. However, this insight into the irreducible relativity of worldview can nonetheless be superseded:

The relativity of every world-view, which runs through spirit, does not have the last word on spirit. Rather, the sovereignty of spirit, spirit as opposed to each single world-view and simultaneously positive consciousness of it, is never the one reality there for us in spirit's various modes of comportment.¹⁸

In opposition to this position, Heidegger turns to Baden neo-Kantianism: within the rubric of the critical premises of Kantian provenance, philosophy abdicates the claim to metaphysics, that is, the claim to a universally valid worldview, but philosophy likewise holds onto philosophy's relatedness to worldviews. On the basis of a critical theory of knowledge, philosophy establishes itself as a universal philosophy of value and consequently creates the scientific foundation upon which

accrues a possible world-view congruent to this foundation, accordingly itself a scientific world-view. It is a world-view that wants to be nothing other than the interpretation of the meaning of human Dasein and of culture with regard to the system of what is absolutely valid, with regard to the true, the good, the beautiful, and the holy—values shaped into valid norms in the course of the humanity's development.¹⁹

It is not difficult to recognize Rickert's position in this presentation, which, briefly sketched, is as follows. In all definitions of philosophy, it is indisputable for Rickert that philosophy, other than any regional science, "inquires into the 'All' and eventually has to reach what we call a 'world-view,' a word difficult to dispense with."²⁰ According to each underlying concept of world, two different paths at first offer themselves:

the entirety of the world may be conceived from out of an object and a unity is arrived at by the fact that the subject, as it were, has been pulled

into the objective world, or conversely, the subject provides the ground for and finds the objects in an all-embracing world-subject."²¹

If, however, worldview implies that the meaning of life or the significance of the I should become intelligible in the world, then objectivism does not lead us anywhere: world is understood as the causally ordered whole and that means for Rickert that all personal life, freedom, and responsibility is destroyed.²² But the chasm between life and science is also not to be bridged by a pure subjectivism: if, namely, the aims and purposes of the subject are themselves worthless, they cannot give *Dasein* any meaning. It is only when the starting point is a doctrine of value that the problem of worldview can be solved. Values form a realm unto themselves; they do not exist but are effective (*gelten*). The world is accordingly to be conceived as the unity of the real and of values.

They are the object of philosophy, and all regional sciences are held responsible to the knowledge of the real alone. But how can philosophy, which has its starting point in a pure doctrine of value, do justice to the claim that it interprets the meaning of life? In other words, how can a worldview as the unity of reality and value be reached?²³ Values are not to be formulated platonically as transcendent value-realities in the sense of an absolute measure, nor can the unity of value and reality be conceived in the sense of a life-philosophy as a merely intuitively accessible lived experience.

Positively put, of course, values must be transferred from the Platonic heaven of ideas to this side, to the reality of life. But the dualism between value and reality cannot be dissolved in the immanence of pure lived experience. For if the claim were posited as such, the conception of the meaning of life would become itself untenable. The only viable way for Rickert to escape from this difficulty lies in the nonobjectifying contemplation of acts, which grasps the meaning of these acts as a posturing (*Verhalten*) and positioning (*Stellungnehmen*) with respect to values.²⁴

More precisely, this means that from out of the experience of acts, the formation of concepts can be carried out in three different directions. Lived experience can be understood as pure reality connected to other realities; reality can be "faded out" in favor of the contemplation of the assessed values in their validity. Yet in the end we cannot

bring either direction to fruition and still, or rather exactly for this reason, unite them. It so happens that we think of the act only as a statement (*Stellungnahme*) with respect to values, but we leave the lived experience of acts, to the extent that it is at all possible, in its lived originality and immediacy. Then if we accordingly presuppose a concept of value and use it only to complete the mere attempt at formulating a concept, which is found in the lived experience of an act, we nonetheless maintain a concept, and this concept then contains the connection we seek between value and evaluation.²⁵

Rickert comprehends this way of formulating concepts, which in itself applies neither to reality nor to values, as an interpretation of meaning.²⁶

The interpretation of meaning is . . . neither an assessment of being nor a mere understanding of value, but is rather the comprehension of a subjective act with consideration for the way it signifies value, for its comprehension as a statement with respect to what is valid.²⁷

This understanding of philosophy as the interpretation of meaning can do justice to the richness of life: it is rooted in the experience of historical life, a life in which historical, cultural goods manifest themselves; philosophy brings about an awareness of these cultural goods and develops the aims of the future as a guideline (*Vorgabe*) for what is to be reached through cultural work.²⁸

Historically seen, the die is cast, according to Heidegger, in favor of the second "Rickertian" position. Still a third possibility must however be contemplated, if merely for the sake of systematic completion, namely the possibility that between philosophy and worldview there is no connection at all.²⁹ If, however, philosophy until now either was, as metaphysics, itself a worldview, or as scientific philosophy, it necessarily tended toward a worldview, then the radical separation of philosophy from worldview must lead to a "catastrophe" of all philosophy hitherto.³⁰ That means that philosophy itself becomes a problem.

Heidegger notices a paradox: The dissolution of the relationship between philosophy and worldview would not only rob philosophy of its

"royal, superior calling" to attend to the ultimate questions concerning humanity. At the same time philosophy as science would disappear. For the critical science of values also "has in its system a final, necessary tendency towards worldview."³¹ The paradox, then, is that the emancipation of philosophy from something that is not itself science shatters philosophy as science.

The exposition of the problem already shows, furthermore, that Heidegger cannot side with Husserl's radical critique of all worldview philosophy. In his essay *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (Philosophy as Rigorous Science), Husserl departs sharply from Dilthey's philosophical project with respect to so-called worldview philosophy. This type of philosophy has lost its entitlement with the constitution of a transtemporal *universitas* of strict science.³² If philosophy is to serve practical aims to be realized in time, then philosophy as rigorous science is obligated to a transtemporal idea of science. Yet the mixture of these opposing endeavors is fundamentally inadmissible.³³

Only philosophy as pure science is able to respond to the need (*Not*) of the times: that life presents itself as a mere unintelligible jumble of facts, void of ideas, is the result of mere superstition. This superstition is common to both naturalism and historicism.³⁴ The phenomenon of a crisis, conjured up by this type of superstition, can only be effectively counteracted on the basis of a concept of philosophy as an eidetic science.

If the paradox in question constitutes for Heidegger the genuine problem of philosophy, then the solution cannot be sought along the path pursued by Husserl, that is, a path on which the scientific nature of philosophy is saved through the strict division of philosophy and worldview.³⁵ Heidegger's concept of philosophy as primal science rather aims at demonstrating the unphilosophical character of worldview and simultaneously at absolutely breaking with the "general dominance of the *theoretical*."³⁶

In order to develop this new idea of philosophy as primal science, Heidegger critically examines, as a first step, one of the "most significant philosophical directions of the present day,"³⁷ the position of Baden neo-Kantianism. For this position claims to validate philosophy as a fundamentally primal science.

The most important theorems are as follows. Philosophy is to be formulation as only a theory of knowledge. The object of philosophy is not

the realm of reality but rather that of values. The necessity and undeniable validity of values can be demonstrated only by a doctrine of judgment. When the validity of values is philosophically justified, then philosophy is simultaneously established as primal science. The reason is that, according to Windelband, values also function as axioms for the type of knowledge found in the regional sciences.³⁸

Now when Heidegger tests this approach for its suitability as a primal science,³⁹ there arise two completely different questions. On the one hand, one should test whether the claim formulated within the theory was realized. On the other hand, one must ask whether the intended definition of philosophy as primal science is at all adequate.

The first question, which concerns the method of critique, is not yet fully thought through in the lectures from the 1919 War Emergency Semester. Here it is only briefly mentioned:

How do we decide, with respect to the critical-teleological method, whether it achieves what is expected of it, or whether it fails? The only possibility we have is to demonstrate the suitability, or rather non-suitability of the critical-teleological method as a primal science *from out of itself*, and indeed, through an analysis of its structure. Other criteria to which this analysis may be answerable cannot be made available for a primal-scientific phenomenon.⁴⁰

These succinct remarks make it clear that any claim to primordality cannot be criticized externally. It can only be tested by showing the implicit presuppositions of a given structure. On the other hand, the teleological method should be treated as a primal-scientific phenomenon, that is, from the outset as the object of the idea of philosophy as primal science in Heidegger's sense, which is not yet developed by him here. It is thus already hinted that the new conception of philosophy as a primal science is not to be understood as a merely another alternative, but rather as a theory prior to other philosophical forms.

The first clue concerning the correct interpretation of this "structural analytic," understood as a method for a primal-scientific critical confrontation with a historically existing form of philosophy, is revealed as early as the first step of Heidegger's discussion.

The structural analytic of the critical-teleological method must at first follow the *essential transformation*—more exactly: its final motive—which the method has experienced in contemporary transcendental philosophy as opposed to its form in the system of absolute idealism by Fichte.⁴¹

As it becomes more clear in the 1919 summer semester lectures, which already speak from the standpoint of primal science, the critical confrontation with historical forms of philosophy is carried out as a "*phenomenological critique*" comprising two tasks: first, to understand the historically humanistic motivation actually shaping a type of philosophy, and, second, to understand this type as such.⁴²

The division of the historical and systematic modes of examination is declared by Heidegger to be false. For this "originary method of phenomenological research"⁴³ presupposes that philosophy is grounded in life, which is essentially historical.⁴⁴ Under this condition, the historical motives which can be shown by the method of genetic phenomenology are no longer to be understood in opposition to grounds. If philosophy is not an autonomous, theoretical project, but rather as "sympathy for life"⁴⁵ must grasp intuitively the movement of historical life itself, then subjective and objective motivations are identical. Genuine and originary character of motivations form, under these premisses, the standard of the critique.

Phenomenological critique is not dis-proving, it does not wield counterevidence, but the proposition to be criticized is understood in terms of where, according to its meaning, it comes from. Critique is a positive hearing from out the genuine motivation.⁴⁶

In order to test whether a philosophy of value satisfies the claim to the idea of philosophy as primal science, Heidegger begins with its method, which he, following Windelband, characterizes as a critical-teleological method.⁴⁷ Heidegger further follows Windelband in appreciating Fichte's contribution to the elaboration of this method, although he likewise gives credence to the transformation of this method through the philosophy of his time.

Like Windelband⁴⁸ and later Lask, Heidegger criticizes Fichte's dialectic-

tical method, through which all forms of thought and intuition, all laws and norms should be derivable from the *I qua* act. Such a constructive dialectic is, according to Heidegger, internally impossible. For either the opposites cannot be brought into position from out of themselves, or they unfold themselves onto the "basis of a material givenness—or at least there is the presupposition of this givenness—that is inexpressible and not methodological, therefore contingent."⁴⁹

The motive for the transformation of the teleological method introduced by Fichte lies for Heidegger in the rejection of such a "speculating away from any care for the matter,"⁵⁰ namely a rejection conditioned by the ideal of science in the nineteenth century. In place of an attempt at a deductive dialectic as a method for gaining and justifying norms, the insight into the reliance upon a material pregivenness now comes on the scene, more precisely a givenness from which the laws and norms of reason can be shown. "Psychology and history eliminate the basic flaw of the dialectical method through the methodological function of material pre-givenness."⁵¹

If norms and axioms are not dialectically deduced but are rather shown by virtue of a methodologically ordered material pre-givenness—without, however, these norms being established as norms through the material—then the all-decisive problem of the giving of ideals arises. This is the problem from which Heidegger begins his "destruction" of philosophy of value.

The exposition of this problem is executed in three steps. In the first step, Heidegger raises the objection of a *petitio principii*: that which is supposed to be discerned through this method, or truth as value, is always already presupposed. In the second step, Heidegger shows the relationship among value, ought, and validity to be a problem. From this discussion, Heidegger draws the debilitating consequence that truth is not at all to be primordially conceived as value.

With respect to the first point, philosophy, according to Rickert, is only justified as a theory of knowledge. There is truth only in judgment. From the perspective of Windelband's distinction between representation and judgment, Rickert shows that judging is not an act of mere detached observation. It is rather always a positioning with respect to a value. Knowledge is therefore to be conceived of as an act that is the free recog-

nition of a value. The transcendent value is not the object of knowledge, but is rather valid. Truth as value is the undeniable presupposition of all knowledge, for any challenge to the notion of truth as value likewise itself presupposes its recognition.⁵²

Heidegger's attempt to demonstrate a *petitio principii* with respect to the critical-teleological method takes its departure from Rickert's subjective, transcendental-psychological path.⁵³ The teleological method "wants to be the very methodological means that explicitly raises to consciousness the norms and forms themselves and as such, norms that comply with natural thinking; it wants itself to know thinking and knowing."⁵⁴ The teleological method, consequently, must bring the ideal of thinking to consciousness. It becomes clear, however, that it cannot accomplish this. As knowledge of knowledge, this method already presupposes a consciousness of ideals for its execution. Indeed, knowledge at the second level, viewed psychologically, could take place without consciousness of this ideal. Without knowing, however, the nature of knowledge—not as a psychic process but rather as an accomplishment—theory of knowledge cannot define the region of its object. As such, from the examination of psychic processes, it cannot know but rather always already presupposes the determination of the ideal, in order to be able to know knowing. Thus, "the structural analytic of the teleological-critical method reveals the following: this method presupposes in itself, according to its innermost meaning as a condition for its own possibility, that which it, first and foremost, is supposed to achieve."⁵⁵

This result does not seem very exciting, in view of the fact that Rickert himself concedes the inevitability of such a *petitio principii* in relation to the subjective path.⁵⁶ "If we were not certain of a transcendent object before the examination of an immanent criterium for truth, we would never see anything more than the psychical in the psychic content."⁵⁷ Heidegger's and Rickert's assessment of this *petitio principii* diverge from one another in a characteristic way. While Rickert remains focussed on formulating a transcendent object, Heidegger stresses that the teleological method must always already presuppose the objective content (*Sachgehalt*)—the content (*Inhalt*) or "what" of the purpose, more specifically the ideal, even though the method professes to determine this objective content first through the teleological method.⁵⁸

This accentuation refers to Lask's approach, more exactly to his two-element doctrine and to the so-called *Stockwerktheorie*.⁵⁹ The ideal is the form of the material and simultaneously the structure of material and form. Heidegger consequently interprets the ideal implicitly as the authentic object of philosophy. The nonsensual form, truth, becomes itself a known material that, for its part, is determined by a form. Heidegger's concerns in the second step regarding the givenness of the ought confirms the influence of Lask. These discussions no longer deal with the "what" of the giving of ideals, with the material, but rather with its form, which for Lask consists of validity with respect to nonsensual objects.

With respect to the second point, by applying the Husserlian method of the analysis of constitution, Heidegger exposes multiple confusions with respect to the relation between value, ought, and validity. The teleological method certainly presupposes something like a givenness of an ought. But how does this givenness, which is fundamentally distinct from the givenness of a theoretically known Being, become accessible at all?⁶⁰ It is *noesis* that is inquired into, a *noesis* that, *qua* the givenness of an ought, is a correlate to the *noema*.

As long as the directionality of the original lived experience of the givenness of the ought is not emphasized, that is, the giving of the ought and the taking of the ought, the core of this method, problematic in itself, remains in darkness.⁶¹

Left unclear is not only the mode of the act of lived experience, which functions as a subject-correlate to the ought, but further how certainty is possible through this act. "Does the ought identify itself as itself, and on what basis does it do so?"⁶² In the end, the relationship between value and ought shows itself to be insufficiently differentiated. For not every value is given as an ought; there are many lived experiences of values not connected to an ought, for example that of the delightful.⁶³ Thus,

where the ought as a philosophical concept is used without even the most miniscule concern, because one is blind to the host of problems caught up in the phenomenon of the ought, one carries on unscientific idle talk without ennobling this ought to a cornerstone of the whole system.⁶⁴

This brusque judgement is "tamed," however, as Heidegger detects a sign of the existence of a genuine motive in the "firm grasp of the ought." Indeed, Heidegger rejects Rickert's doctrine of the primacy of practical reason. But the formulation of the ought as a nontheoretical object indicates that knowledge, which depends on the theoretical sphere, is not grounded on itself. It rather requires a nontheoretical foundation, which according to Heidegger, does not reside in practical reason but rather in the pretheoretical sphere of life.

With respect to the third point, What consequences result from this critique of the giving of ideals, a methodological element central to the Rickertian theory of knowledge—the doctrine of truth as value—which in fact constitutes the basis of the entire conception of philosophy as a doctrine of value? Heidegger attacks this theorem, not because he refutes truth as a value, but because he is attempting to prove that this thought can be correctly taken to be an axiom of philosophy—a first, primordial, unqualified foundation. In addition to this, Heidegger makes use of the distinction between value-taking and value-explaining. This distinction derives neither from Rickert nor from Lask, but rather from Heidegger's own conception of philosophy as primal science.

Value-taking, "constituting life in and for itself," is divorced from everything theoretical.⁶⁵ Value-explaining, on the other hand, is a "derivative phenomenon founded in the theoretical sphere, which is itself theoretical."⁶⁶ Value-taking is therefore understood as positing a value of something in light of which something appears valuable. Accordingly, this phenomenon will be excluded by Heidegger from the sphere of practical reason and transported into the pretheoretical sphere.⁶⁷

On the basis of this distinction between value-taking and value-explaining, there is evidence, according to Heidegger, that a true proposition that is valid is not to be found as such in a value-taking.⁶⁸ This evidence demonstrates for Heidegger that no judgment entails a "yes"—or rather—"no" as a genuine correlate to validity. Furthermore, value-taking, and (as Heidegger says) truth-taking reveal themselves as structurally different concerning the relation to the I. "The 'it values' does something to me, forces its way into me." I ascertain that the being-true remains, so to speak, outside.⁶⁹

There are, consequently, no phenomenologically identifiable clues for

conceiving, within the rubric of value-taking, the truth-status of a proposition in the same way as the delightful as such.⁷⁰ Yet even if a phenomenological analysis shows that there is no evidence for Rickert's doctrine, namely that judgments take a position with respect to value, still the notion that truth is not at all to be thought of as value is not yet disproved. What is, however, revealed—and this matters a great deal to Heidegger—is that truth as value shows itself to be, not an originary, but rather a derivative phenomenon.

If the theoretical comportment as such does not at all betray a relation to values, and if this reference to values belongs more to the pretheoretical sphere of the constitution of life in and for itself, then the conception of truth as value can explain value only belatedly “on the basis of a broad, presupposed context of meaning.”⁷¹ Analogically, Heidegger explains that being valid is not an originary phenomenon: “Being valid, in the end, is an objectively constituted phenomenon presupposing intersubjectivity and furthermore historical consciousness.”⁷² Heidegger's critique, therefore, is directed equally against Rickert's doctrine of truth as value as well as against Lask's concept of being-valid as a form of the nonsensual.

With this, Heidegger has reached his goal of testing the claim of philosophy of value to be a primal science. The asserted primordality, with the allusion to necessity, of formulating truth as value, and of having arrived at an epistemological foundation for philosophy, has proved itself to be groundless. This beginning is not a real beginning; it presupposes not only the sphere of life but also the sphere derived from this originary sphere, or the sphere of the theoretical, which first makes possible the explanation of truth as value.

The “intrinsic impossibility” of the teleological method has already been demonstrated through this critique of the giving of ideals as its core element. Heidegger continues the analysis of the method with the intention of clarifying the genuine primal-scientific problem, the axiomatic problem. This new step focuses on the relation between elements earlier treated as separate, which are located between the givenness of matter and the giving of ideals. Here the issue is how real, psychic being and the ideal ought can be related to one another if, as Rickert maintains, they are separated by a gulf.⁷³

The interconnection of value and reality is defined by Rickert as a

third realm of meaning. Heidegger argues that the critical-teleological assessment presupposes not only the positive, content-related relations of matter, which reside under the norm, and the norm as a norm for matter. He further argues that the character of this relation is already determined. In this way, Heidegger moves closer to Lask, whose theory suggests the differentiation of meaning through matter and the way in which the form gives validity.⁷⁴

Without differentiating between the position of Rickert and Lask, Heidegger objects that the presuppositions so far considered have not been sufficiently thought through.

The champions of the teleological method are, so to speak, fascinated with the radical cut between being and value and do not notice that they have theoretically only broken off the bridges between both spheres and now stand helpless at the river bank.⁷⁵

Heidegger shows, starting with the givenness of content, that this flaw in the teleological method does not betray a subjective failing, but rather an objectively insurmountable difficulty. The giving of content must, if it is to meet its purpose in presenting unconditionally necessary, relevant moments seen from the norm, present the content in its “complete characterization” without gaps.⁷⁶ To the extent that the issue concerns an empirical science, psychology, which provides the content, the processes of knowledge, shows itself to be incapable of fulfilling this requirement. The contents made available by a science of experience necessarily remain provisional, hypothetical, and relative. For first of all, new facts can always be discovered and, through epistemological progress, present themselves to the already known facts otherwise than as before. As such, the teleological method is in the end dismissed as unsuitable for a primal science: if the foundation of critical judgement continually sways, so sways the house of philosophy built upon it.⁷⁷

The structural analytic of the teleological method, then, leads by and large to the result that the giving of ideals neither grounds itself as elemental, nor can the ideals or norms be recognized with the claimed absolute certainty, if one starts with the psychic processes as content pre-given by psychology. The alleged progress of the critical-teleological

method over against the Fichtian dialectic shows itself, when looked at more closely, to be a dead end.

If one looks back at the structural analytic as a whole, one can see the decisive influence of Lask's philosophy: that Heidegger formulates the teleological method as existing out of the rudimentary givens of matter and giving of ideals, and that he furthermore conceives the ideal itself as the unity of content and form, shows that the whole formulation of the analysis is taken from Lask's two-element theory and from his *Stockwerktheorie*. If, accordingly, Lask's theory is taken as a basis from which Windelband and Rickert are criticized, without it being explicitly discussed as such, it remains to be asked whether this basis for a primal-scientific methodological discussion does not determine the subsequent course of the investigation.

First it must be realized that in the Laskian perspective one can find what Heidegger considers a positive result of the structural analytic and what he determines as the point of departure for the further clarification of primal science: the insight into the "fragility of the fact and of knowledge of the fact, of the 'faktum.'" ⁷⁸ In the *Logik der Philosophie*, Lask not only saw, aside from the complex constructions of form and matter, the givenness of a "logically naked matter" only accessible in immediate lived experience, ⁷⁹ he also showed, in his Fichte book, in opposition to Rickert and Kant, that the method of comprehending historical individuality, taken from Fichte, is not possible as a logical, i.e., conceptual method provided that the analytic logic is principally not in the position to grasp the individual as such. ⁸⁰ Only a nonconceptual, immediate representation, a feeling in the broadest sense, can represent the individual as such. One can see Lask's thought in the background, given that Heidegger continues his investigation at all through an expanded contemplation of content, and given that he furthermore calls for a new mode of contemplating content, one that is independent of the giving of ideals and does not include something like an object, something theoretically grasped.

In order to verify Heidegger's opening thesis—that his idea of philosophy as primal science resolves the worldview problem by showing the unphilosophical character of all worldviews together with the nontheoretical character of philosophy—the most important elements of this conception of philosophy can be presented in outline. The basis for all fur-

ther reflections is the distinction between two kinds of lived experience: process and event, which distinguish themselves roughly by the following features. ⁸¹ The subject of the lived experience qua process is the impersonal I in general; the subject of the lived experience is each time the historical singular I. While the lived experience qua event is "placed" (*verortet*) in the world around us, the lived experience qua process is worldless; world is extinguished. The decisive distinction, however, is found in the following: lived experiences are in a way reflexively self-referential. The way of having lived experiences is, with regard to events and processes, fundamentally different.

We characterize the objectified happening, the happening as something objective, known, as a process; it simply goes by us, goes before my knowing I and this emptied reference to the I, reduced to the minimal lived-experience, is only related to this I as being-known. ⁸²

The lived experience *qua* event, on the other hand, is distinguished by having or seeing the lived experience itself in a lived experience. "The lived experience or being-in-life (*Er-leben*) does not go by me, like something I make out to be an object, but I myself appropriate it for me, and it appropriates itself according to its essence." ⁸³ It is clear that the following is meant: the lived experience (*Er-leben*) *qua* event, e.g., experiencing a sunset, is a living toward something (*auf etwas zu*) in the sense that the "full, historical I" discloses this sunset for itself as a historical I. The justification for this, that this mode of self-reference is that of a lived experience, is found in a form of identity theory: because the historical I experiences the sunset transitively, the self-appropriation of the lived experience is according to its essence itself a lived experience, for its essence is precisely to be actively experienced by the I.

On the basis of these heterogenous modes of content, Heidegger develops his conception of philosophy as primal science. If what is specifically characteristic of this content should ever be scientifically conceived, a fundamental problem arises with respect to lived experiences as events. The problem concerns whether scientific thematizing does not necessarily, inevitably rob lived experiences as events of their genuine nonobjective character. ⁸⁴ In order to solve this problem, Heidegger distinguishes several

modes⁸⁵ of "something" which serve as a point of departure for different modes of thematizing.⁸⁶

The relationship of these modes of "something" is formally determined. The modes of the theoretical something are conditioned by the modes of the pretheoretical something. Within the theoretical and pretheoretical something are submodes respectively differentiated as determinable or determined. Both points of differentiation combine in the following manner: the determinable mode of the pretheoretical founds the determinable mode of the theoretical something, and this is likewise the case for the determined.⁸⁷

It is, however, important to consider that the determinable and the determined modes, at each level, form moments for themselves of a whole, so that here, it should be noted, the determinable mode additionally presents the originary moment.

The decisive categories for the idea of philosophy as primal science are the preworldly and formal-logical something. The concept of the preworldly something is an ontological concept, through which the fundamental character of life is determined:

the "something-character" belongs to life absolutely. This is the phenomenological something. It extends to the sphere of life, to life in which nothing world-laden is yet differentiated: the phenomenological something-character is preworldly. The primal character of the "something at all" is the fundamental character of life at all—that it, life, is motivated in itself and tends toward itself; motivating tendency, tending motivation: to "world out" (auszuwelten) into determinate worlds of lived experience, the fundamental character of life—living toward something (zu etwas hin).⁸⁸

If the preworldly something marks the fundamental character of life, this does not only mean that it marks its essential, determining ground but rather its character as ground. Life is the ground of determined life, i.e., life is considered as a dynamic universal explicating and differentiating itself. Life is the determinable tending toward determination, and what is determined is as such simultaneously motivated in life itself.

The concept of the formal-logical something marks the kind of concept adequate to the ontological sphere of life; this concept of the form-

logical something is thus "placed" (*verortet*) in the sphere of theory and that of the logical. Heidegger emphasizes a correspondence between the logical and ontological in relation to the indeterminacy or universality of both modes of something: "*Anything that can be experienced at all is a possible something, irregardless [sic] of its genuine world-character.*"⁸⁹

This universality of the formal-logical something corresponds, consequently, to the potentiality of life that has not yet "broken out" into determinate worlds. Of primary importance for Heidegger, however, is not to establish a correspondence; the issue concerns rather the knowledge that the logical is grounded in the ontological. The universality of the formal-logical something is according to Heidegger an indication of its groundedness in life as such.

This pretheoretical, preworldly "something" is as such the fundamental motive for the formal-logical something of objectivity at all. Its universality is grounded in the universality of the pretheoretical primal something.⁹⁰

It is only suggested as to how this motivation of the logical something is to be thought through life: according to Heidegger, the tendency of life to break out into worlds can "be theoretically deflected" before the moulding of determinate worlds.⁹¹ The formal-logical something, motivated in the potentiality of life as such, is the basis for philosophical concepts, the object of which is life. What Heidegger wants to guarantee through the characterization of the formal-logical something is the possibility of a theory not constructed at a level divested of life, which does not depart from an innerworldly experience. Such a theory would namely not be capable of grasping life as ground, i.e., as the origin there in advance of all that is determinate. Because the formal-logical something is motivated immediately by the "in-itself of the streaming lived experience of life,"⁹² the basic character of corresponding philosophical concepts would be a universality tending from the indeterminate to the determining, i.e., they themselves come from the mode of life:

The preworldly and worldly functions of signification express what is essential in their character as event, i.e., they accompany (experiencing

and experiencing the experienced) lived experience, they live in life itself, and as accompanying, they are simultaneously approaching and bearing the approach in themselves.⁹³

This means that philosophical concepts are not only grounded in life but that they live in accordance with life. They themselves release possibilities, as Heidegger later says, or in the terminology of 1919, they themselves have the character of lived experience so that through these philosophical concepts, the historical I “appropriates” for itself life and world. The basic methodological problem of a primal science of life understood as the indeterminate origin of all determinacy, which as this condition of all objects could be thematized in a nonreified manner, is clarified in the following formulation: the primal-scientific concepts made possible by the formal-logical something do not objectify and do not establish; motivated in life, they come from the mode of life, i.e., above all, an analogous dynamic or movement comes to them.

On the basis of this outline, if one once again considers the suspicion, gathered from Heidegger’s critical confrontation with Rickert, that Lask’s philosophy remains a determining influence for the idea of philosophy as primal science, one can depict the similarities and differences between them with greater precision.

The distinction between two kinds of lived experience, process and event, is the departure point for developing the idea of philosophy as primal science. Both kinds of lived experience are conceived by Heidegger, drawing on Lask, as complex constructions of content and form; the same content, something like a sunset, can be experienced in different ways. Philosophy is involved with lived experiences qua events, i.e., with contents whose form is lived experience determined by the identity of subject and object. This form of individual lived experience is the content for the objects of philosophy; the form of these objects is the formal-objective something. Seen in this way, Heidegger’s schema seems to be a preparation for a doctrine of categories following Lask’s *Logic of Philosophy*.

One cannot overlook the fact, however, that Heidegger’s intention in attempting to realize a basis for a philosophy of life is different than Lask’s intention. What ensues from this difference is first of all shown by the position of the concept of lived experience, which deviates from Lask’s:

where with Lask, lived experience correlates fundamentally with the content of an object, Heidegger’s version of lived experience surfaces as the form of the object in the first and second *Stockwerk*.

Heidegger characterizes the hermeneutic intuition indeed as an “experience of experience.”⁹⁴ But if it is considered further that for Heidegger the logical is grounded in the ontological, i.e., that the formal-logical something is motivated by the preworldly something of life, then it becomes clear how radically this turn in life-philosophy transforms the Laskian formulation. The structural parallel between life and philosophical concepts means the following for a philosophical doctrine of categories: the structure of life, its fundamental character, is not only the content of philosophical concepts, i.e., what is to be understood. The concept as concept—as one finds in Lask—is nothing other than something merely determined along with this matter, apart from its being thought in a form different from matter. The concept as concept, i.e., as form of the mode of life, is thought much more thought—living in life, as Heidegger says.

If one could already detect in Lask’s theory of material differentiation the intention to deprive the sphere of logic of its power,⁹⁵ so Heidegger pushes this development to the extreme. The concept in no way resembles an independent, autonomous function detached from life. The thought of the transcendence of truth is given up—the Rickertian as well as the Laskian conception (as value, or as form). Truth is immanent in life.

It is clear that Heidegger’s life-philosophical theory of the philosophical concept renders senseless Lask’s terminology of form and matter as the basis of a philosophical doctrine of categories. That Lask’s formulation and intention nonetheless remain determinative can be seen not only in the sketched elaboration of Heidegger’s idea of philosophy as primal science. The concepts of the determinable and the determined, thus content and form, underlie the schema linking modes of something and the concept of an idea of philosophy as primal science.

Still to be examined is how these concepts of Heidegger’s, laid out in paragraph 2a of the lecture, structure anew a life-philosophical version of a “Logic of Philosophy.” Heidegger strictly rejects the natural assumption that his idea of philosophy as a primal science of life grounding itself in life is particularly suited to account for the need of a worldview. The expectation that this new idea of philosophy could accomplish, in the then

current style of philosophy, the clarification and justification of the meaning of life underestimates its radicality.

Heidegger's radical departure from all Platonism completely counters the need, underlying the worldview problem, for assessment and orientation of dynamic life by means of firm, stable standards. The unphilosophical character of any form of worldview asserted at the beginning of the lecture now becomes comprehensible on the basis of Heidegger's new idea of philosophy. If philosophy distinguishes itself from other theoretical forms in that it takes form as theory in the way suggested above, then a worldview's way of objectifying and absolutizing life, the way in which it brings life to a standstill, conflicts with philosophy as primal science. In a worldview, there is no self-immersion in life but rather a "standstill" outside of life.⁹⁶ The reference to worldview is fundamentally untenable for philosophy as primal science.

To what extent the separation of philosophy from a worldview is to be understood as a response to the supposedly epochal crisis-consciousness found at the beginning of the twentieth century becomes discernible in the 1920 summer semester course *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks*.⁹⁷ I will here merely highlight two decisive points.

First, the prior self-understanding of philosophy as science is based in, and solidifies, the distinction between the transtemporal universal and the temporal-historical particular. When philosophy is placed in the transtemporal realm, philosophy and life are ripped apart from one another, and philosophy is prevented from unfolding and taking root in *Dasein's* self-knowledge, i.e., from "giving" *Dasein* understood in its factual, ever-historical truth. This is what is meant in the last of the early Freiburg lectures, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*:

As such, it is not philosophy's task to care for universal humanity and culture, or to relieve future generations once and for all of the trouble of questioning, or additionally to interfere via topsy-turvy claims to validity. Philosophy is what it can be, only as a philosophy of its "time."⁹⁸

The problem of relativism, sharpened by historical consciousness, is to be solved, according to Heidegger, by overcoming the last remains of Platonism, of every kind of absolutism. In place of the appeal to a

"chimerical in-itself" and to a pretention to the absolute, there will be the assumption of responsibility for factual, historical *Dasein*.

Second, given that philosophy as science objectifies life, in a certain way it first creates the problems that it promises subsequently to solve. The meaning of life arises from *Dasein's* self-concern and cannot be externally tacked on to it. "All reality contains its primordial meaning through the concern of the self."⁹⁹

The dilemma determined by Husserl between temporal agency conditioned by dubitable, challenged norms and the idea of philosophy as a strict science is circumvented by the concept of philosophy as primal science. Philosophy positions itself within the sphere of life. The renunciation of a superior position is the simultaneous relinquishment of false claims. It is only from this new perspective that life can be validated as the primordial, constitutive sphere of value and meaning. This is Heidegger's early, radical alternative—an alternative already begun by Nietzsche—to Rickert's Platonic attempt at grounding a philosophy and a worldview in transcendent values.

NOTES

1. Cf. M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* vol. 56/57, B. Heimbüchel, ed. (Frankfurt: 1987). I am indebted to Amy Morgenstern for the English translation.
2. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 121–20.
3. H. Rickert, "Gutachten über die Habilitationsschrift des Herrn Dr. Heidegger," in "Heidegger's Lehrjahre," by Thomas Sheehan, in *The Collegium Phaenomenologicum. The First Ten Years*, J. Sallis, G. Moneta, and J. Taminiaux, eds. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 77–137. Cf. p. 118.
4. Cf. M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 1, F. W. von Hermann, ed. (Frankfurt: 1978) pp. 59–188, in particular pp. 176ff; cf. the 1914 review of Charles Sentrout, *Kant und Aristoteles*, *ibid.*, pp. 49–53, in particular pp. 52ff.
5. Cf. *ibid.* pp. 189–411, here p. 191.
6. *Ibid.*
7. The 1984 habilitation by Claudius Strube already showed the essential features of the history of the development of *Sein und Zeit* before the documentation of the *Denkweg* was given through the *Gesamtausgabe* of Heidegger's work.

Here Heidegger's critical confrontation with neo-Kantianism is granted particular relevance. Cf. C. Strube, *Zur Vorgeschichte der hermeneutischen Phänomenologie* (Würzburg: 1993). Thomas Kiesel, on the basis of extensive material disclosed partly through his own research, pursues this theme in *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

8. Martin Heidegger, "Lebenslauf (1915)," in Sheehan, "Heidegger's Lehrjahre," p. 116.

9. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 117.

10. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, pp. 180ff.

11. Cf. J. A. Barash, *Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988) p. 146.

12. Cf. W. Dilthey, *Das Wesen der Philosophie* (1907), in *Gesammelte Schriften* 5, G. Misch, ed. (Leipzig and Berlin: 1924); W. Dilthey, *Zur Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, 8, B. Groethuysen, ed. (Leipzig and Berlin: 1931); E. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (1910/1911), ed. W. Szilasi, ed. (Frankfurt a. M. 1965); H. Rickert, "Vom Begriff der Philosophie" *Logos* 1 (1910/1911): 1-34; H. Rickert, "Vom System der Werte" *Logos* 4 (1913): 295-327; H. Rickert, "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen und Philosophie der Werte" (1920) in *Karl Jaspers in der Diskussion*, H. Saner, ed. (München: 1973), pp. 35-69; K. Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauung* (1919; München: 1994); M. Heidegger, "Anmerkungen zu K. Jaspers Psychologie der Weltanschauungen" in Saner, *Karl Jaspers in der Diskussion*, pp. 70-100; cf. H. Meier, "Weltanschauung," *Studien zu einer Geschichte und Theorie des Begriffs*, diss. (Münster: 1967).

13. Husserl, *Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft*, p. 65.

14. On this cf. K. C. Köhnke, *Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus. Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie zwischen Idealismus und Positivismus* (Frankfurt: , 1983), in particular pp. 404ff.

15. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 5.56, p. 8.

16. *Ibid.*, 8, S. 86.

17. Cf. *Ibid.*, 8, S. 87ff.

18. *Ibid.*, 5, S. 406.

19. *Ibid.* 56/57, 9.

20. Rickert, "Vom Begriff der Philosophie," p. 2.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 7.

23. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 19.

24. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 24.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

26. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 26ff.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

28. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 28.

29. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 11.

30. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 12.

31. *Ibid.*

32. Cf. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, p. 61.

33. Cf. *ibid.*

34. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 66.

35. Cf. also Rickert's self-defense in response to Husserl in *Vom System der Werte*, pp. 324ff.

36. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, pp. 12., 86. Regarding the literature on the early Freiburg lectures, in addition to the monograph of Kiesel already mentioned (in particular pp. 38-58), cf. Kiesel's "Das Kriegsnotsemester 1919: Heidegger's Durchbruch in die hermeneutische Phänomenologie," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 99, no. 1 (1982): 105-22; "Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes 'Faktizität' im Frühwerk Heideggers," *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* 4 (1986/87): 91-120; Thomas Kiesel/J. v. Buren, eds., *Reading Heidegger from the Start. Essays on His Earliest Thought* (New York: 1994); in this in particular J. M. Fehér, "Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Lebensphilosophie: Heidegger's Confrontation with Husserl, Dilthey, and Jaspers," pp. 73-90 and G. Kovacs, "Philosophy as Primordial Science in Heidegger's Courses of 1919," pp. 91-110. Cf. also J. H. Barash, "Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning," ch. 3.

37. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 128.

38. Cf. W. Windelband, "Kritische oder genetische Methode?" (1883) in *Präliminarien. Aufsätze zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte*, vol. 5 (extended edition Tübingen: 1915), p. 107.

39. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 52.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 39ff.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

46. Ibid., p. 126.
47. Cf. Windelband, pp. 126ff. "Kritische oder genetische Methode?"
48. Cf. *ibid.*
49. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 40.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 41. Cf. H. Rickert, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* (Freiburg: 1892), pp. 66ff, in particular pp. 70–72.
52. Cf. H. Rickert, "Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie. Transzendentalpsychologie und Transzendentallogik," in *Kant-Studien* 14 (1909): 169–228.
53. Cf. Rickert, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* (Tübingen 1928), p. 245ff; in the first edition, Rickert realizes the existence of a circle. Cf. p. 64.
54. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 40.
55. Ibid., p. 44.
56. Ibid., 6th ed., p. 247.
57. Cf. E. Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre*, (Tübingen: 1923), pp. 45ff, 92ff.
58. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 44.
59. In his essay, "Lebenswerte und Kulturwerte" (*Logos* 2, [1911/1912]: 131–66), Rickert among other things criticized *Lebensphilosophie* for being the fashionable philosophy of his time. His decisive objection was that one could not gather values from life itself (cf. p. 153); it is only through reason and philosophy as a science that it is possible to show the validity of independent values resting in themselves. Heidegger's distinction between taking a value and explaining a value takes part, against Rickert, in a kind of *Lebensphilosophie*. If life itself posits values, then this points to Nietzsche. Regarding the relation between practical reason and the pretheoretical sphere of life, cf. vol. 56/57, p. 59.
60. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 44.
61. Ibid., p. 45.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., p. 46.
64. Ibid., p. 45.
65. Ibid., p. 48.
66. Ibid.
67. Cf. Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie*, pp. 58ff.
68. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 51.
69. Ibid., p. 49.
70. Cf. *ibid.*

71. Ibid., p. 51.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., p. 54.
74. Cf. Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie*, pp. 73ff.
75. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 55.
76. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 57.
77. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 58.
78. Ibid.
79. Lask, "Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte," *Gesammelte Schriften*, E. Herrigel, ed., vol. 7 (Tübingen: 1923), pp. 152ff. See also M. Heinz, "Die Fichte-Rezeption in der südwestdeutschen Schule des Neukantianismus," forthcoming.
80. See also M. Heinz, "Die Fichte-Rezeption in der südwestdeutschen Schule des Neukantianismus," forthcoming.
81. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, par. 15.
82. Ibid., p. 74.
83. Ibid.
84. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 111ff.
85. Naturally this is not, terminologically, about genus and species.
86. Regarding the following, cf. *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, par. 20 as well as the excerpt from Brecht's postscript to this lecture, edited by C. Strube in *Heidegger-Studien* 11 (1996): 9–14.
87. Regarding the concepts determinable and determined, cf. *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, par. 2a.
88. Transcript 11.
89. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 115.
90. Transcript 11.
91. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 116.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., p. 117.
94. Ibid.
95. Cf. K. Hobe, *Emil Lask: Eine Untersuchung seines Denkens* (Ph.D. diss, Freie-Universität, Berlin, 1968), p. 100.
96. Cf. Transcript 13.
97. Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 59, C. Strube, ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: V. Klostermann, 1993); see in particular par. 19.
98. Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 63, K. Bröcker-Ottmanns, ed., p. 18.
99. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 59, p. 173.

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