Center for Commentary Interpretations of Kant (ZetKIK)

The Doctrine of Virtue is one of Kant's main ethical works, which has long been unjustifiably neglected in philosophical research. Currently, large parts of the Academy edition of Kant's complete works, which is authoritative for research, are undergoing a critical revision as part of a comprehensive project of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, including the Theory of Virtue. Prof. Schönecker is responsible for compiling a new historical-critical edition of the Doctrine of Virtues; as the edition and interpretation are interwoven, a comprehensive commentary on the Doctrine of Virtues is being compiled at the same time.
DFG funding was successfully acquired to carry out the edition and interpretation.

Maja Schepelmann
is entrusted with the editing work, Elke Elisabeth Schmidt
together with Mr. Schönecker with the interpretation.

Contact: Prof. Dr. Dieter Schönecker

Collaboration on the Kant Lexicon with contributions on the following keywords:

• "duty of love"
• "imperative"
• "Imperative, categorical"
• "Imperative, analytic"
• "Imperative, synthetic"
• "Enthusiasm, moral"
• "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals"
• "Interest, practical"

by Wilko Ufert, M.A.

by Elke Elisabeth Schmidt

Working title of the dissertation

Contemporary Natural Law Ethics and the Philosophy of Sexuality: An Analysis and Critique.

Description of the doctoral project

The aim of this thesis is an analysis and critique of the new natural law ethics: What does a modern natural law ethics look like, what principles underlie a new natural law ethics, what solutions does natural law ethics propose with regard to much-discussed ethical problems, what evaluation criteria are formulated in order to be able to evaluate actions ethically at all and what obligations or prohibitions to act result from this for us humans?
As an introduction, natural law ethics will be presented in a historical discussion; however, the focus will be on a systematic analysis and further development of the new natural law ethics, which is currently represented in the Anglo-Saxon world by John Finnis, Robert P. George, David S. Oderberg and in Germany by Robert Spaemann.
In the main systematic section, three central discussion contexts will be addressed in particular:

1. natural ends and the good
2. The moral law, moral rights and moral duties in new natural law ethics
3. Natural law ethics as non-consequentialist ethics

In order to show that natural law ethics is still a coherent and plausible moral theory that is also capable of discussing and resolving problems of the current ethical debate, the natural law ethical position with regard to the euthanasia issue (and possibly the discourse on gay marriage) is examined, presented, criticized and expanded in an extensive chapter.
The project is intended to be particularly innovative and interesting in that unresolved problems and questions regarding the fundamental principles of natural law ethics, the collision of moral rights, the application of the principle of double effect and the catalog of so-called "basic human goods" will be addressed and resolved through new examples and arguments, without dissolving the basic framework of natural law ethics.

by: Christian Prust

Working title of the dissertation

'I think' as an empirical sentence in the paralogisms of the KrV

Description of the doctoral project

The aim of my dissertation is to interpret the sentence "the sentence 'I think' is an empirical sentence" in terms of commentary. Despite its importance for the understanding of Kant's philosophy, especially the KrV, research and interpretations of this sentence have so far received relatively little attention. One reason for this is the difficulty of understanding the sentence. This difficulty is due to the fact that the concepts of Kant's transcendental philosophy must be dealt with primarily before the thesis of the thinking empirical ego can be addressed. But the fact that the core concepts in his philosophy underlie the thesis is in turn a major reason why the interpretation of this difficult proposition is so important, for to support this thesis with such concepts means to be able to take a good path to understanding his philosophy by interpreting the proposition. Therefore, my dissertation has two main parts; the first main part deals with the context of a theory of 'I think', in which the essential points of transcendental philosophy related to the thematized proposition are reviewed; the second main part deals with the commentary interpretation of some selected passages to which the proposition "The proposition 'I think' is an empirical proposition" directly refers; the passages are B422 f. Note; B428 f. from the KrV; "VII142, VII397 f. from the Anthropology; XXVIII590 f. from the Metaphysics L2. The passages from the KrV represent the main passages and the other passages are treated as parallel passages; the passages outside the KrV are thus only used to support the interpretation of the main passages in the KrV.

by: Hyeongjoo Kim

Working title of the dissertation

Meaning and scope of Kant's concept of maxims

Description of the doctoral project

Unfortunately, Kant did not leave us a systematic treatise on rational agency. His theory of action presents itself scattered in his treatises on ethics, philosophy of law and religion and in some passages from works of a different nature. At the center of this theory of action is the concept of the maxim. All actions of rational beings are determined by maxims. However, it is not easy to understand exactly what would fall under the concept of maxims according to Kant. The definitions given in the GMS cannot be reconciled, at least at first glance. The only definition given in the KpV as well as the examples given by Kant also show no common unity. In my dissertation, I intend to examine the meaning of the concept of maxim in Kant's practical philosophy. To this end, I will first make a detailed analysis of all definitions of "maxim" that occur in Kant's work. I will then turn to an examination of the origin of the concept of maxim in the 18th century and relate this concept to the way in which a practical syllogism should be constructed according to Kant. Finally, I will deal with interpretative problems and the examples given by Kant.

by: Daniel da Rosa

Working title of the dissertation

The second section of Kant's "Dispute of the Schools" (AA, VII, 79-94) - Commentary interpretation of the argumentative core passages

Description of the doctoral project

At a central point in his late work "The Controversy of the Schools", Kant answers the title question of the second section, "Renewed Question: Whether the Human Race is in Constant Progress Toward the Better?", affirmatively. According to a summary in the seventh of ten chapters, it is a "proposition tenable for the most rigorous theory: that the human race has always been in progress towards the better and will continue to do so". With this "proposition", Kant formulates what is probably the strongest systematic variant of a progress thesis, which he develops in several of his treatises on the philosophy of history ("Idea", "Gemeinspruch", "Friedensschrift", "Erneuerte Frage"), but which he also repeatedly modifies. I am interested in the meaning and justificatory context of the progress thesis in this very treatise, the "Renewed Question".

Using the means of commentary interpretation, I will first pursue the following questions concerning the meaning of the thesis: 1. does "progress towards the better" really mean, as some passages suggest, progress in the narrower sense of moral sentiment or, as other passages in the same treatise suggest, only progress in legal relationships? 2. how can "the human race" be conceived as a subject, insofar as Kant places great emphasis in this writing on the fact that this does not (solely) refer to a collective of political actors, e.g. a nation or a league of nations, but to humanity as a whole? 3. what claim to validity does Kant associate with a "proposition" that is supposed to be "tenable in spite of all unbelievers [...]", namely "for the strictest theory"? Does he really claim to have gained a theoretical insight, as is assumed in the literature? Does such an interpretation not conflict with the main results of Kant's theory of knowledge? Or can a more satisfactory meaning of 'tenable for' be reconstructed (e.g. parallel to the "proof of freedom" of the second critique)?

by: Volkmar Schocke